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EBAY BECOMES A GIRL'S NEW BEST FRIEND AS THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SIDESTEPS THE NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DOCTRINE,
LEAVING TIFFANY TO POLICE COUNTERFEITS IN THE ONLINE
MARKETPLACE
Lisa Williford Arthur*
This article examines the recent Second Circuit decision of Tiffany
v. eBay and the effect it has on the nominative fair use doctrine.
The Second Circuit was the first circuit to consider the doctrine of
nominative fair use in the online marketplace. However, the
Second Circuit failed to expressly recognize the doctrine, likely
due in part to the current circuit split on nominative fair use. In
addition, the Lanham Act lacks clarity by only recognizing
nominative fair use in the trademark dilution context. In light of
Tiffany v. eBay, this article argues for the need for legislative
clarity in the Lanham Act by recognizing the nominative fair use
doctrine as an affirmative defense to direct trademark
infringement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tiffany. The company behind that one word spurred more than
170 years of luxury jewelry and one of the most successful jewelry
businesses in the world.' Since 1837, Tiffany & Co. ("Tiffany")
has been the leading provider of diamonds to the rich and famous.2
Tiffany is also innovative, creating unique designs from rare
J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012. I would
like to thank everyone who helped with this piece, including the editors and
fellow staff members of JOLT. Also, a special thanks to Professor Deborah
Gerhardt for her guidance and edits to this article. I would also like to thank my
wonderful husband and family for their support.
1 See The Tiffany Story, TIFFANY & Co., http://www.tiffany.com/About
/TheTiffanyStory/#p+ 1-n+6-cg+viewPaged-c+-s+0-r+-t+-ri+-ni+1-x+-pu+-f+/0
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
2 See id. (citing information found in video clip).
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diamonds. But how did Tiffany become so successful in the
jewelry marketplace?
The answer is the Tiffany brand, captured by the one word that
started it all.4 When you buy a Tiffany diamond, you know you
are buying a high-quality, exclusive product.' In fact, Tiffany
designs have graced the necks of First Ladies for decades,
including Jackie Onasis Kennedy and Mary Todd Lincoln.'
Tiffany china was featured in meals served in the Lyndon B.
Johnson White House.' Tiffany is even credited with designing the
Great Seal of the United States, as seen on the back of the dollar
bill, and the National Football League Trophy.' The Tiffany brand
attracts as consumers world leaders, sports fans, Hollywood stars,
and others, both famous and not, around the world.9
Tiffany has invested many resources in protecting its name
from being associated with anything other than the superior
products it designs and produces.'o Its jewelry is only offered for
3 See id
4 See generally Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88
N.C. L. REV. 427, 435 (2010) ("The common narratives associated with certain
marks contribute to public knowledge and cultural identity."). The Tiffany brand
refers to both the Tiffany trademark and the narrative associated with the brand.
See The Tiffany Story, supra note 1 (citing information found in video clip).
6 A Celebrated Following, TIFFANY & Co., http://www.tiffany.com/About/
TheTiffanyStory/#p+l-n+6-cg+viewPaged-c+-s+0-r+-t+-ri+-ni+1 -x+-pu+-
f+/1/0/3/0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); An American Institution, TIFFANY & CO.,
http://www.tiffany.com/About/TheTiffanyStory/#p+ -n+6-cg+viewPaged-c+-
s+O-r+-t+-ri+-ni+1 -x+-pu+-f+/1 /0/7/0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
7 An American Institution, supra note 6.
8 Id.; Sports Trophies, TIFFANY & Co., http://www.tiffany.com/About/
TheTiffanyStory/#p+1-n+6-cg+viewPaged-c+-s+0-r+-t+-ri+-ni+ I-x+-pu+-
f+/1/0/8/0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
9See A Celebrated Following, supra note 6.
'0 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc. (Tiffany 1), 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing Tiffany's CEO's testimony that Tiffany invested
fourteen million dollars in anti-counterfeit measures over a five-year period).
The court also found that Tiffany had the burden of policing its products in the
secondary marketplace. See id at 518. See generally 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 12:1, :16 (4th ed.
2010) (describing trademark dilution and generic terms). Failing to protect their
brand could lead to trademark dilution, or, even worse, turn Tiffany into a
generic brand. See id § 12:1. By not pursuing suit against eBay, Tiffany runs
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sale through its stores, catalogue, Web site, or Corporate Sales
Department." Tiffany has also resisted the temptation to increase
its profit margin by selling its surplus to discount retailers.12
Unfortunately for Tiffany, policing the Tiffany brand is much
harder than it used to be.13 While in the past Tiffany was able to
control the distribution channels for its product, today, due to the
emergence of the online marketplace and the secondary market for
Tiffany products, Tiffany has lost that distribution control.14 In
fact, eBay made approximately $4.1 million on the sales of Tiffany
jewelry and watches listed on its Web site from April 2000 to June
2004." In response to the growing counterfeit market, Tiffany
created a "Buying Program" to police counterfeit goods being sold
on eBay, but the high volume of counterfeit goods has made it
difficult for Tiffany to sue individual sellers.16 As a result, Tiffany
the risk of consumers associating its name with counterfeit products. Similarly,
if the Tiffany name becomes generic, the company will lose all trademark rights
to the brand (like Jell-O and Aspirin). See id. §§ 12:1, :16.
1 Tiffany 1, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
12 See id Selling its products to discount retailers or secondary markets
would lead to the dilution of the Tiffany brand, making the jewelry no longer
distinctive or exclusive. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 50, Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay Inc. (Tiffany ll), 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008
LEXIS 821406 at *70.
13 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 109-10 (holding Tiffany responsible for policing
its trademark use on the Internet). The emergence of the online marketplace and
the secondary market in Tiffany products has led to an increase in the sale of
counterfeit Tiffany goods. See id at 97. For example, 73.1% of the Tiffany
goods purchased from eBay by Tiffany's "Buying Program" in 2004 were
counterfeit. Id. In 2005, 75.5% of Tiffany goods purchased from eBay by
Tiffany's "Buying Program" were counterfeit. Id.
14 See Tiffany I, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 472-74.
" Id. at 481. EBay is an online marketplace that allows consumers to buy and
sell products on its Web site, www.ebay.com. Id at 474.
16 See id at 481 (stating that Tiffany brought actions against individual
sellers, including over 600 enforcement actions). In 2003, Tiffany decided to
stop pursuing individual sellers and discuss the problem with eBay. Id. Tiffany
also created the "Buying Program" by hiring an independent survey company to
assess how many Tiffany goods sold on eBay were counterfeit. See id. at 485.
Tiffany then purchased the alleged Tiffany goods on eBay from a randomized
list generated by searching for products with the keywords "Tiffany" or
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is losing the battle in policing its products, as 75.5% of the goods
purchased through the "Buying Program" in 2005 were
counterfeit.1
Furthermore, eBay is actively contributing to the problem."
For example, eBay used the Tiffany name to advertise its cheaper
non-Tiffany product offerings on its Web site.1 9 In a trademark
infringement suit brought by Tiffany in the Southern District of
New York (Tiffany 1), eBay defended its use of Tiffany's
trademark under the nominative fair use doctrine, which allows a
defendant to use a plaintiffs trademark to identify the plaintiffs
product.20 The District Court applied the doctrine of nominative
fair use and found for eBay.21 Two years later, in a landmark
victory for eBay, the Second Circuit (Tiffany II) held on appeal that
eBay could lawfully use Tiffany's trademark to describe its
product offerings, but the court did not recognize the nominative
fair use doctrine.22
This article will examine the recent Second Circuit decision in
Tiffany II and the effect that it has on the nominative fair use
doctrine. The Second Circuit's failure to expressly recognize the
doctrine, while essentially enforcing it, shows that now, more than
ever, the Lanham Act needs to explicitly reflect this doctrine so
that Courts can uniformly apply the law. With the emergence of
the online marketplace and the increase in trademark infringement
"sterling." Id Of the 186 Tiffany goods purchased in 2004, 136 were
counterfeit. Id
1 Id at 485.
18 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 103.
19 See id. See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., No. 1:04-cv-4607,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96596, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010) (holding that
eBay was not liable under the Lanham Act for false advertising).
20 Tiffany I, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
21 See id. at 495. The court did not choose between the Ninth Circuit and the
Third Circuit approach to nominative fair use. See id. at 495 n.27. Rather the
court defined the nominative fair use doctrine as follows: "'[a] defendant may
use a plaintiffs trademark to identify the plaintiffs goods so long as there is no
likelihood of confusion about the source of defendant's product or the mark-
holder's sponsorship or affiliation."' Id. at 496 (quoting Merck & Co., Inc. v.
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
22 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 103.
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claims, there is an added pressure for Congress to recognize
nominative fair use in all uses, not just trademark dilution. This
article argues for the need for legislative clarity in the Lanham Act
by recognizing the nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative
defense to direct trademark infringement. Part II discusses the
definition of nominative fair use. Part III addresses the current
circuit split on the nominative fair use doctrine. Part IV provides
an overview of Tiffany I and II, including both the District Court
and the Second Circuit holdings. Part V examines what Tiffany II
added to the nominative fair use jurisprudence, particularly in the
online marketplace context, and how this shows that now is the
time for a legislative clarification in the Lanham Act. Part VI
concludes with an argument for the need to recognize the
nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense under the
Lanham Act.
II. NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DEFINED
Nominative fair use is a common-law doctrine that allows a
defendant to use a plaintiffs trademark to name the plaintiffs
product if the defendant's use does not confuse the consumer by
implying that the plaintiff is affiliated with the sale.23 Nominative
fair use is different from classic fair use.24 Classic fair use
recognizes a defense against trademark infringement where a
defendant uses a "'plaintiff's mark to describe the defendant's own
product."' 2 5 Nominative fair use occurs when the defendant uses a
"plaintiffs mark 'to describe the plaintiff's product."'26  For
example, a mechanic advertising that he is fixing BMWs would
fall under the nominative fair use doctrine, whereas a baker using
Splenda in his advertisement promoting the sale of his apple pies
would fall under the classic fair use doctrine. The distinction is
23 See Tiffany I, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (citing Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 413).
24 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992)); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:11.
25 Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150 (quoting New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308); see also
McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:11.
26 Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150 (quoting New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308); see also
McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:11.
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significant because classic fair use is an affirmative defense,
codified in the Lanham Act,27 whereas nominative fair use is a
doctrine created by the Ninth Circuit.28
In addition to the distinction between classic fair use and
nominative fair use, it is important to distinguish descriptive fair
use and nominative fair use. Classic fair use accounts for
descriptive use of a mark, which is expanded upon in § 1115(b):
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement
is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his
own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such
party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and
in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or
their geographic origin... .29
Descriptive use, however, falls under the definition of classic fair
use, and the definition of classic fair use in this section does not
include nominative fair use. 0 The purpose of the nominative fair
use doctrine, on the other hand, is to protect uses of a trademark
that identify goods associated with that trademark, rather than
describe it.31
Nominative fair use is implicated if the trademark is "entitled
to protection" and the use of the mark by the defendant is "likely to
confuse" the consumer about the affiliation of the trademark
holder.3 2 If the trademark usage is nominative, some courts have
applied a specific nominative "likelihood of confusion" analysis,
as opposed to the classic fair use "likelihood of confusion"
27 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b), 1125(c) (2006). Note that the Lanham Act is
recognized in the United States Code. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006) ("Act July
5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, which is classified to this chapter, is popularly
known as the 'Lanham Act' and also as the 'Trademark Act of 1946."').
28 See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10,
§ 23:11.
29 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:11.
32 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Savin Corp. v. Savin
Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 456 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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analysis, while court another recognized the doctrine as an
affirmative defense.33
III. THE NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DOCTRINE: THE CURRENT
CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit provide the leading
case law on the nominative fair use doctrine. The Ninth Circuit
created the doctrine, while the Third Circuit modified the Ninth
Circuit test to be an affirmative defense.34 Other circuits have
considered the doctrine but added very little, if anything, to the
jurisprudence."
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The nominative fair use doctrine originated in the Ninth Circuit
with New Kids on the Block v. News American Publishing, Inc.36
There, the music group "New Kids on the Block" sued USA Today
for creating a poll in its newspaper soliciting readers to vote on
33 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. PubI'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992) (applying a specific nominative "likelihood of confusion"
analysis: (1) "the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark"; (2) "only so much of the mark or
marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service"; (3) "the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder"); see also Century
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding nominative fair use should be applied as an affirmative defense). But
cf AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)
(explaining that the classic fair use test, used to determine a "likelihood of
confusion" between products analyzes the following factors: (1) "strength of the
mark"; (2) "proximity of the goods"; (3) "similarity of the marks"; (4) "evidence
of actual confusion"; (5) "marketing channels used"; (6) "type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser"; (7) "defendant's intent in
selecting the mark"; (8) "likelihood of expansion of the product lines").
See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 228; New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
See, e.g., Universal Commc'n Sys. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir.
2007); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F. 3d 243, 256 (6th Cir.
2003); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-47 (5th Cir.
1998).
36 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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which band member in the group was the "most popular."37 "New
Kids on the Block" claimed trademark infringement for USA
Today 's use of its trademark in the article.38 USA Today asserted a
fair use defense, and the Ninth Circuit responded with the creation
of the first nominative fair use doctrine as a three-pronged test:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second only so much of the
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service; and third the user must do nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder.39
After applying the newly-created, three-pronged test, the court
found USA Today met its burden and was not liable for trademark
infringement because its use was nominative.4 0
As a result, the test outlined by the Ninth Circuit was to be
used for nominative fair use cases instead of the classic fair use
"likelihood of confusion" test.41 The Ninth Circuit elaborated that
the nominative use of a trademark should not be subject to
infringement claims because it did not trigger unfair competition or
the "source-identification function" of trademark law.42 Rather,
37 Id at 304.
38 Id
39 Id at 308. USA Today had the burden of proving that its use did not cause
confusion and met all three elements of the test. See id. Contra AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining that the
classic fair use test, used to determine a "likelihood of confusion" between
products, analyzes the following factors: (1) "strength of the mark"; (2)
"proximity of the goods"; (3) "similarity of the marks"; (4) "evidence of actual
confusion"; (5) "marketing channels used"; (6) "type of goods and the degree of
care likely to be exercised by the purchaser"; (7) "defendant's intent in selecting
the mark"; (8) "likelihood of expansion of the product lines").
40 New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308-09.
41 See id. at 308; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding the nominative fair use test should be applied instead of
the classic fair use test).
42 New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 ("Because it does not implicate the source-
identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute
unfair competition; such use is fair because it does not imply sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.").
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when the trademark is used simply as a means to identify or
describe a sale, consumers should not be confused by the mark.43
B. The Third Circuit Approach
The Third Circuit adopted the concept of nominative fair use
but took it a step further by recognizing the doctrine as an
affirmative defense of trademark law.44 However, the Third
Circuit did not replace the traditional "likelihood of confusion" test
created by the Ninth Circuit.45 Rather, the Third Circuit eliminated
sections of the traditional "likelihood of confusion" test that did
not apply directly to nominative fair use claims.46
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit also adopted a three-
pronged test for a nominative fair use defense.47 However, in the
Third Circuit, the plaintiff must first prove that there is a
"likelihood for confusion."48 Only after establishing the
"likelihood of confusion" can the defendant attempt to mitigate
liability by proving that use of the plaintiffs trademark was fair.4 9
To do so, defendant must demonstrate the following factors:
(1) [T]hat the use of plaintiffs mark is necessary to describe both the
plaintiffs product or service and the defendant's product or service; (2)
that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiffs mark as is
necessary to describe plaintiffs product; and (3) that the defendant's
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between
plaintiff and defendant's products or services."o
43 See id; see also Carins v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150-52 (9th
Cir. 2002) (applying the Ninth Circuit test); Playboy, 279 F.3d at 800-05
(applying the Ninth Circuit test).
44 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228
(3d Cir. 2005). Century 21 brought a claim for trademark infringement against
Lendingtree for using its trademark on Lendingtree's Internet referral service.
Id. at 214.
45 Compare id. at 220-21, with New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
46 See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 220-22.
47 See id at 222.
48 Id. Contra New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 (holding the defendant has the
burden of disproving the "likelihood of confusion").
49 Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222.
50 Id.; see also Commerce Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Hill, No. 1:08-cv-5628, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60550, at *4244 (D.N.J. June 18, 2010) (applying the Third
Circuit test); David's Bridal, Inc. v. House of Brides, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-5560,
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Tiffany v. eBay
C. Other Circuits'Approaches
The First Circuit recognized the concept of nominative fair use
but did not explicitly accept or reject the doctrine." In an infamous
case regarding the use of the "Boston Marathon" name in a local
advertisement, the First Circuit recognized that trademark law
usually allows trademarks to be used for descriptive purposes,
known as fair use.52
The Fifth Circuit also did not take a position on the nominative
fair use doctrine.53 However, the Fifth Circuit's approach to fair
use is similar to the Ninth Circuit's. In Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour
18 I Ltd.,54 the Fifth Circuit considered the Ninth Circuit's
definition of nominative fair use and rejected the first element of
the test.55 The court also stated the nominative fair use claim and
the "likelihood of confusion" test should be analyzed together.6
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit would not follow the "bifurcated
approach" of the Third Circuit, which requires the "likelihood of
confusion" analysis to occur before the assertion of the nominative
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4763, at *10-14 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2010) (applying the
Third Circuit test); Syncsort, Inc. v. Innovative Routines Int'l, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-
3623, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35364, at *39-40 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2008) (applying
the Third Circuit test); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. 0:04-cv-
4371, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13775, at *14, *19 21 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006)
(applying the Third Circuit test).
5i See Universal Commc'n Sys. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007).
52 WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991).
See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-47 (5th Cir.
1998).
54 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998).
5 1 d. at 546 n.13.
56 Id. at 547; see also Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech.
Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Although the
alleged nominative fair use should usually be considered along with the
likelihood-of-confusion analysis, we have declined to require any particular
method for the consideration in cases where the nominative use is not a
significant factor in the liability determination.").
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fair use defense." Surprisingly, many District Courts in the Fifth
Circuit recognize and apply the nominative fair use doctrine."
The Sixth Circuit considered the doctrine in PACCAR, Inc. v.
Telescan Technologies, L.L.C.5 9 but declined to take a position on
nominative fair use, stating, "[lt]his circuit has never followed the
nominative fair use analysis."60 However, in examining the Ninth
Circuit's approach, the Sixth Circuit stated, "[we] are not inclined
to adopt the Ninth Circuit's analysis here."61
The Second Circuit made clear that it would not take a position
on the nominative fair use doctrine in Tiffany II.6 2 However, the
court did acknowledge nominative fair use and even previously
recognized the doctrine in Chambers v. Time Warner (Chambers
II).63  Even though the Second Circuit in both Tiffany II and
Chambers II denied taking a position on nominative fair use, the
district courts in Tiffany I and Chambers v. Time Warner
(Chambers I)" applied the doctrine to each case.
5 Compare Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211,
221 (3d Cir. 2005), with Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 547.
58 See Nat'1 Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 4:08-cv- 1906,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102152, at *20-21 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2009); Mary Kay,
Inc. v. Weber, No. 3:08-cv-0776, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72235, at *9-10
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009); Mannatech, Inc. v. Glycobiotics Int'l, Inc., No. 3:06-
cv-0471, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20040, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2008).
59 319 F. 3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that even if the court did adopt
the doctrine of nominative fair use, Telescan's use would not fall under the
doctrine).
60 Id. at 256.
61 Id. (explaining that the court did not reject the doctrine but would not be
inclined to take the Ninth Circuit approach if the doctrine was recognized in the
Sixth Circuit); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharon Woods
Collision Ctr., No. 1:07-cv-457, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86651, at *16-17 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) ("[T]he status of the 'nominative fair use' defense is
unclear within this circuit").
62 600 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2010).
63 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing the Ninth Circuit's nominative
fair use test as applied by the district court); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
10, § 23:11 (discussing the pre-Tiffany circuit split).
64 123 F. Supp. 2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
65 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102-03 (declining to apply the nominative fair use
doctrine); Chambers II, 282 F.3d at 156 (declining to apply the nominative fair
12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 29, 40
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Given the circuit split on the issue, the future of the nominative
fair use doctrine is uncertain. Since the Supreme Court has yet to
directly rule on the doctrine and the Lanham Act lacks clarity, the
circuits are fragmented in their approaches to the doctrine."
IV. OVERVIEW OF TIFFANY V. EBA Y
A. Background on Tiffany v. eBay
Tiffany initially brought this action in the Southern District of
New York, claiming that eBay was liable for the high volume of
counterfeit Tiffany goods available on eBay.67 Even though
Tiffany conceded that individual sellers are responsible for the
product listings, Tiffany argued that eBay was on notice that the
problem existed due to the findings of Tiffany's "Buying Program"
and subsequent complaints by eBay customers." In its defense,
eBay asserted that it invested twenty million dollars a year in its
Trust and Safety Department to monitor counterfeit goods and
suspend such listings.6 9 EBay also proactively searched for
counterfeit listings through its fraud engine and provided avenues
use doctrine). Contra Tiffany I, 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 498-501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(applying the nominative fair use doctrine); Chambers I, 123 F. Supp. at 202
(applying the nominative fair use doctrine).
66 See Ron Coleman, Forget Breakfast-eBay Eats Tifany's Lunch,
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION (Apr. 1, 2010, 11:59 PM),
http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/?p=5285 ("They seem to want a fence to
remain around trademark law, lest anyone get too close and actually be able to
predict what the law might be."). The Supreme Court has yet to directly rule on
the nominative fair use doctrine, and they are unlikely to. Id
Tifany I, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
61 Id at 481-82, 487. Tiffany also policed its products through individual
seller suits and "enforcement actions" including dealing with local and
international police to seize Tiffany counterfeit goods and contacting individual
sellers to demand they stop selling counterfeit products. Id. at 481. Tiffany's
counsel also communicated with eBay multiple times about the number of
counterfeit goods on eBay, including reporting findings from the "Buying
Program" showing that 73.10% of Tiffany jewelry sold on eBay were counterfeit.
Id at 485.
69 Id. at 476.
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for owners to report counterfeit listings through its "Verified
Rights Owners Program.70
B. Direct Infringement Claim
Tiffany brought its direct trademark infringement claim under
§ 32 of the Lanham Act, claiming that eBay used its trademark
without permission.7 1 The Lanham Act states that a user of a
trademark is liable if the use is "[1]ikely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive."72 In its appellant's brief, Tiffany
argued that "[i]t is hard to imagine a situation more likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive than the advertising and listing
for sale of counterfeit goods."" As evidence of infringement,
Tiffany pointed to eflay's use of the mark to advertise on its
homepage, as well as eBay's purchase of "sponsored links," which
included the Tiffany trademark.74
C. District Court and Second Circuit Decisions
Applying the nominative fair use doctrine, the District Court in
Tffany I held that eBay was not liable for direct trademark
infringement because the nominative fair use doctrine protected its
uses of Tiffany's trademark." The District Court relied on the
70 Id at 477-78. EBay created a fraud engine, which performed keyword
searches to detect counterfeit listings, looking for words such as "knock-off,"
"counterfeit," "replica," or "pirated." Id at 477. EBay also created a Verified
Rights Owner Program (VeRO), which is a "'notice-and-take-down' system"
that allows owners to report counterfeit listings. Id at 478. Finally, eBay
encouraged owners to create "About Me" pages. Id. at 479. Specifically, on
Tiffany's "About Me" page, the company disclosed that most Tiffany goods
offered for sale on eBay were counterfeit. Id. at 479.
7i See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
7 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3-4, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.
(Tiffany II), 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008 LEXIS 821405
at *6.
74 See Tiffany I, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 494. EBay purchased "sponsored links" on
Google and Yahoo!, which are a type of online advertising that cause eBay
listings for Tiffany jewelry to appear on search engine results. See generally
Ads, GOOGLEGUIDE, http://www.googleguide.com/ads.html (last visited Oct. 12,
2010) (showing sponsored links on Google's homepage).
7 See Tiffany 1, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97.
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nominative fair use doctrine rather than classic fair use for two
main reasons: (1) consumers testified that they did not assume
Tiffany was affiliated with their purchase on eflay, and their main
reason for purchasing the jewelry on eBay was to obtain the
product at a lower price; and (2) eBay posted a disclaimer about
the high percentage of counterfeit goods on its Web site."
The Second Circuit in Tiffany II essentially affirmed the
District Court's reasoning but did so through the application of a
general principle from case law rather than the more established
nominative fair use doctrine.7 The general principle applied by the
court allowed a defendant to use a plaintiffs mark when the use
was for identification purposes and did not suggest that the
plaintiff was affiliated with the defendant." The appellate court
concluded that eBay's conduct did not cause direct trademark
infringement because eBay was merely describing a brand name of
products available for sale on its Web site." As a result, the Court
of Appeals declined to recognize the nominative fair use doctrine
in the Second Circuit."o
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT EXEMPLIFIES THE NEED TO
RECOGNIZE THE NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DOCTRINE, ESPECIALLY
IN THE ONLINE MARKETPLACE CONTEXT
76 Id. at 498.
7 See Tiffanyll, 600 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2010). Contra Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 220 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the
nominative fair use doctrine); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc.,
971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the nominative fair use doctrine).
71 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102-03; see also Dow Jones & Co. v. Int'l Sec.
Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) ("While a trademark conveys an
exclusive right to the use of a mark in commerce in the area reserved, that right
generally does not prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately
describing it by its brand name, so long as the trader does not create confusion
by implying an affiliation with the owner of the product."); cf Prestonettes, Inc.
v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (citing Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
311, 327 (1924)) ("When the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the
public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the
truth. It is not taboo.").
79 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 103.
so See id.
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Despite the willingness of some of the circuit and district
courts to recognize the nominative fair use doctrine, the Second
Circuit continues to sidestep the doctrine, while essentially
enforcing it, creating confusion as to whether to apply the
doctrine."
Instead of formally recognizing the nominative fair use
doctrine, the Second Circuit applied a two-pronged test to evaluate
the direct trademark infringement claim: "[D]efendant may
lawfully use a plaintiff's trademark where doing so is necessary to
describe plaintiff's product and does not apply a false affiliation or
endorsement."8 2 Thus, the Second Circuit held that eBay used the
mark to describe Tiffany's products available for sale on its Web
site, and eBay did not imply that Tiffany was affiliated or endorsed
the sales on the eBay Web site.83
However, the Second Circuit's test functions just as the
nominative fair use doctrine recognized by the District Court in
Tiffany I and other circuits. For example, consider the Southern
District of New York's definition of nominative fair use: "[A
defendant uses] a plaintiffs trademark to identify the plaintiffs
goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about the
source of the defendant's product or the mark-holder's sponsorship
or affiliation."84 Also consider part of the original definition of the
nominative fair use doctrine used by the Ninth Circuit: "[S]econd,
only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user
must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.""
Even though the Second Circuit defined nominative fair use
and adopted the District Court's ruling in finding there was no
8i See id. at 102-03 (declining to apply the nominative fair use doctrine but
applying a general principle similar to the nominative fair use doctrine).
82 [d
83 Id.
84 Id at 102 (quoting Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
85 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).
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direct trademark infringement, the Second Circuit ultimately did
not take a position on the doctrine." However, despite failing to
take a position on the doctrine, the Second Circuit continues to
apply the principles of nominative fair use."
Tiffany II was a perfect opportunity for the Second Circuit to
bring the doctrine of nominative fair use into the online context,
but it failed to do so, foreshadowing new problems for the Lanham
Act in the online marketplace context." Tiffany II suggests that
with the ease of online advertising and the emergence of the online
marketplace, Internet companies can use trademarks at will to
advertise what they are selling as long as these companies take
some anti-counterfeiting measures. 9 Unfortunately, since not all
online sites have twenty million dollars invested in fraud engines
and anti-counterfeit measures, the dangers of allowing other, less
established sites to follow the eBay framework could lead to more
trademark infringement claims if Congress does not create more
affirmative defenses in the online marketplace context.90
86 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102.
1 See id. at 102-03.
8 See Eric Goldman, eBay Beats Tiffany in Second Circuit, but False
Advertising Claims Remanded, TECH. & L. MARKETING BLOG (Apr. 1, 2010,
2:02 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/04/ ebay mostly bea.htm
("[T]he opinion intentionally sidesteps some key open doctrinal questions
squarely raised by the case-such as if the Second Circuit recognizes the
nominative use defense, or the Second Circuit's standards for contributory
trademark infringement. As a result, we don't get the clean and decisive
doctrinal standards that help make a case truly precedent-setting . . . ."); see also
Shanna Bailey, Comment, Fighting an Anonymous Enemy: The Uncertainty of
Action Sites in the Face of Tiffany v. eBay and LVMH v. eBay, 40 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 129, 145 (2009) ("Overall, it appears that the court's message is that the
current laws governing trademarks, particularly the Lanham Act, do not
adequately cover situations arising within the cyber context."); Fara S. Sunderji,
Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability
Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc. Problem, 74
FORDHAM L. REv. 909, 940 (2005) (arguing that "Congress ... should enact a
digital safe harbor amendment to the Lanham Act to deal with the increase of
Internet-based trademark infringement").
89 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102-03.
90 See Tiffany 1, 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Steven
Seidenberg, Online Companies Get a Bye on Using Trademarks, 96 ABA J. 1,
12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 29, 45
Tiffany v. eBay
If courts continue to recognize the freedom of online
marketplaces to use other brand names to describe items for sale,
as in Tiffany II, the Lanham Act needs to expressly recognize the
doctrine as an affirmative defense so that Internet providers, like
eBay, can save time and money on litigation and focus on
advertising to consumers. Further, for online companies not
similar to eBay in terms of business models and resources, Tiffany
II still leaves questions as to whether those companies will get the
same protection under the law.91 Tiffany I seems to imply that as
long as an online company has a "notice-and-takedown" procedure
in place, then it will be protected under some form of the
nominative fair use doctrine. 92 Only time will tell if other online
companies will be treated the same way.
VI. RECOGNIZING THE NOMINATIVE FAIR USE DOCTRINE AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WILL LEAD TO A UNIFORM
APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Tiffany I exhibits the need for legislative clarification
regarding the nominative fair use doctrine and its application to
trademark law.93 Currently, courts decline applying the doctrine
because it is not explicitly reflected in the Lanham Act, and
practitioners are left guessing whether to apply the doctrine at all.94
Particularly in light of Tiffany II, a legislative clarification in the
Lanham Act recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative
16 (2010), available at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/ article/mark trail/
("'Courts may expect service providers to provide the industrial-strength level of
protection that eBay provides, but small startups can't do that,' says Eric
Goldman, a professor at Santa Clara University School of Law. 'I am concerned
this case would send the wrong signal to small startups: Set up industrial-
strength protections or you'll be sued out of existence."').
91 See Pamela T. Church, Marcella Ballard & Joi M. Lakes, Challenges for
Brand Owners and Marketplace Sites in the Wake of Tiffany v. eBay, BAKER &
McKENZIE (July 2010), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/RRTiffanyEBayJul10/.
92 See Goldman, supra note 88.
93 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102-03.
94 See generally Universal Commc'n Sys. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st
Cir. 2007) (refusing to apply the nominative fair use doctrine); Pebble Beach
Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-47 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to apply
the nominative fair use doctrine).
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defense is a proposed solution. This change would create a
national standard and allow courts to apply nominative fair use to
all trademark infringement claims, not just those that fall under §
1125(c).
A. Statutory Confusion Created by the Recognition ofNominative
Fair Use as an Affirmative Defense Only to Trademark
Dilution Claims in § 1125(c)
Section 1125(c) of the Lanham Act, discussing trademark
dilution, includes the nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative
defense." Trademark dilution is a recognized remedy for
trademarks that fall within the terms of the Lanham Act and are
famous and distinctive."6 Trademark dilution differs from direct
trademark infringement in that general infringement covers all
marks, not just those that are famous." Famous marks are defined
as those "[g]enerally recognized by the consuming public."98
In contrast, § 1125(a), § 1114, and § 1115(b) discuss trademark
infringement and remedies and do not include the nominative fair
use doctrine.9 9 Since trademark dilution is an alternative remedy
under the Lanham Act, it would be logical to recognize the
nominative fair use doctrine in § 1125(a), § 1114, or § 1115(b), but
Congress has failed to do so."oo The result is confusion as to
whether nominative fair use applies to all trademark infringement
claims or only trademark dilution claims.
1. Application ofNominative Fair Use in a Trademark Dilution
Context
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) ("The following shall not be actionable as
dilution ... (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a
designation of source for the person's own goods or services ....
96 See id.
9 See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (describing direct trademark
infringement claims).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 112 5(a).
'oo See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (declining to recognize nominative fair use); 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (declining to recognize nominative fair use). But see 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c) (recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense).
12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 29, 47
Tiffany v. eBay
Courts are less likely to apply the nominative fair use doctrine
to trademark infringement claims that do not fit comfortably into
the trademark dilution mold because these uses would fall outside
of the context of § 1125(c).'0 ' For example, consider the
application of § 1125(c) to counterfeit goods. Counterfeit goods
exhaust the bounds of trademark dilution because they do more
than just dilute the brand and usually involve other claims, such as
contributory trademark infringement and conversion. 102 In
particular, courts recognizing USA Today 's use of "New Kids on
the Block" in a descriptive headline or Lendingtree's use of
Century 21 in its real estate referral service were more comfortable
recognizing these uses as nominative.o" However, in cases where
the defendants associated the Tiffany brand with counterfeit
products or Pebble Beach with a Texas golf course that copied
various holes from famous golf courses, courts were not as
comfortable applying the nominative fair use doctrine.'04
In interpreting § 1125(c), the Ninth Circuit observed the
following: "Uses that do not create an improper association
between a mark and a new product but merely identify the
1o0 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (recognizing the following uses under the fair use
defense: comparative advertising; identifying, parodying, or criticizing a
famous mark; news reporting and news commentary; noncommercial uses of the
mark); see also Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2010) (refusing to apply
the nominative fair use doctrine to a claim involving counterfeit goods); Pebble
Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 545-47 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
apply the nominative fair use doctrine to a claim involving a golf course that
copied holes of famous golf courses in designing its course); 4 MCCARTHY,
supra note 10, § 24:124 (explaining that nominative uses that do not cause
blurring or tarnishment are exempted under the statute).
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (defining trademark dilution as "blurring or
diluting by tarnishment of the famous mark... ."); see also Tiffany II, 600 F.3d
at 96 (claiming direct trademark infringement, contributory trademark
infringement, and false advertising); Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 535 (claiming
"common-law unfair competition, conversion, and civil conspiracy and for
service-mark and trade-dress dilution" in addition to direct trademark
infringement).
103 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 220-
22 (3d Cir. 2005); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d
302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
104 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102-03; Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 545-47.
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trademark holder's products should be excepted from the reach of
the anti-dilution statute."' 5 Therefore, the associations of Tiffany
with counterfeit jewelry and Pebble Beach with a local Texas golf
course could create these "improper associations," and the courts
are not as likely to apply the nominative fair use doctrine in these
contexts.'
2. Rationale for Including the Nominative Fair Use Doctrine in
§ 1125(c)
The question remains, why is the nominative fair use defense
limited to trademark dilution claims? As further explained in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles,"' nominative fair use does not
cause dilution."'8 Rather, dilution is caused when associations are
made with the mark. 109 Nominative fair use does not create
associations; it merely identifies a source."o
One reason that the doctrine is limited to § 1125(c) could be
because Congress did not consider it. This section was originally
drafted in 1946, and it is possible that Congress has not considered
an amendment because the case law supporting nominative fair use
as an affirmative defense is fairly recent."' Also the Third Circuit
in Century 21 Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc.112 was the first circuit to
apply the nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense,
and this case was decided recently in 2005."'
Furthermore, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, passed in
1995 and revised in 2005, created a separate cause of action for
dilution claims in § 1125(c).1' Therefore, it is logical to assume
that Congress was only focusing on trademark dilution in passing
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d. 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002); 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 24:124.
06 See Playboy, 279 F.3d at 806.
07 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
* Id at 805.
109 Id at 806.
110M
1' H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 1 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091,
1091 (stating that the original Trademark Act was drafted in 1946).
11 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
113 See id. at 228.
114 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
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the amendment including nominative fair use as a defense and not
evaluating other sections of the Lanham Act at the time.
Another reason for the distinction could be that Congress did
not intend to apply the nominative fair use doctrine as an
affirmative defense to all trademark infringement claims. The
original draft of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act applied the
nominative fair use defense to all claims brought "under this
section," meaning the fair use defense would apply to all claims
under § 1125."' However, after Congressional debate on the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, the amendment was changed to
apply the fair use defense to claims only brought "under this
subsection.""' Those arguing in favor of the change convinced
Congress that the use of the language "under this section" was a
drafting error.
In addition, two other arguments have been advanced as to why
the language in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act was changed.
First, some argued that First Amendment concerns are more
prevalent in trademark dilution claims, where trademark usage can
be censored without a plaintiff proving there is a "likelihood of
confusion.""' Therefore, the fair use defense should be applicable
only to these claims. 9 Second, some argued that applying the fair
use defense to all trademark infringement claims would create a
legislative loophole in § 1125(d), allowing the defendants to profit
from purchasing Internet domain names through the protection of
the nominative fair use defense.120
115 See MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 24:123.
6 See id.
" See id.
" Paul A. Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act-A Consumer
Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189, 1217 (2006)
("To be sure, the First Amendment issues are most pronounced in the dilution
context, where speech is being suppressed despite the complete absence even of
any concern about confusion.").
119 See id.
120 See id. at 1219 .. . if the 'this section' language were left in place, it
would create an unintended loophole in § 43(d) ... [Section 1125(d)] was
enacted . . . to deal with the rampant problem of profiteers registering the
trademarks of companies as domain names and trying to extract money from
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3. Problems with Leaving Nominative Fair Use Only in
Trademark Dilution
Statutorily, it does not make sense to leave the nominative fair
use defense only in § 1125(c) of the Lanham Act. Nominative fair
use should be broadened and recognized in all direct trademark
infringement claims, not just trademark dilution claims.
As discussed in Tiffany I, famous mark holders, unlike ordinary
trademark holders, have the burden of policing their marks.12 '
Famous trademarks are more likely to become generic, and famous
trademark holders would lose their ability to protect their mark
under the Lanham Act. 12 2 Consequently, famous trademark holders
would be more likely to bring an action for any use of their mark to
protect it from becoming a generic term, like Jell-O or Aspirin.123
However, the emergence of the online marketplace has in
effect diluted the distinction between famous and ordinary
trademarks. All trademark holders are responsible for policing the
use of their trademark online.'24 Because the Internet makes it so
easy to create an article, a webpage, or even an advertisement,
ordinary trademarks can become famous overnight, thus making
trademark liability more frequent and this distinction less
important.125 If the courts are going to put such a heavy burden on
trademark owners wishing to own the domain names that incorporate their
trademarks. To that end, the statute applies when the defendant acts with 'a bad
faith intent to profit' from the mark. [A]llowing noncommercial or fair use to
override a bad faith intent to profit would transform that factor into a dispositive
issue. . .. ").
121 See Tiffany 1, 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y 2008).
122 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 12:1
("Sometimes genericide occurs as a result of the trademark owner's failure to
police the mark, resulting in widespread usage by competitors leading to a
perception of genericness among the public, who sees many sellers using the
same term.").
123 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 12:1 (stating that once a word becomes
generic, it cannot be registered as a trademark). Therefore, Aspirin and Jell-O
are so commonly used that the companies can no longer claim trademark
infringement for their use. See id. § 12:16.
124 See Tiffany 1, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
125 See Ronald D. Coleman & Roberta Krause, Online Auction Sites and
Trademark Infringement Liability, N.Y. B. Ass'N,
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all trademark users to police their marks, eventually all trademark
holders will start policing more frequently, or at least Tiffany will.
Therefore, nominative fair use will become even more necessary
for users as a defense to all types of trademark infringement, not
just trademark dilution involving famous marks.
Congress clearly favored recognizing nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense under fair use in § 1125(c).126  Thus, it is
inconsistent to decline to make the same distinction in § 1125(a),§ 1114, or § 1115(b). If Congress is recognizing classic fair use as
a defense to trademark infringement but only recognizes
nominative fair use in the trademark dilution context, it would be
logical to recognize the doctrine in these sections and apply
nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to all infringement
claims.
Without further guidance from the Lanham Act, it is
understandable that courts, like the Second Circuit in Tiffany II, are
hesitant to recognize the nominative fair use doctrine in direct
trademark infringement claims that are not specifically tailored to
trademark dilution claims. Now is the time for Congress to
recognize all descriptive uses of trademarks as an affirmative
defense so courts do not have to keep trying to fit their cases into
the trademark dilution context.
B. Congress Needs to Recognize Nominative Fair Use as an
Affirmative Defense
Congress needs to recognize nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense so that courts, like the Second Circuit in
Tiffany II, can feel comfortable applying the doctrine in all
trademark contexts, not just trademark dilution. Also in
recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, a
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Online%/o2OAuction%/o20Sites%/o2OFinal%/o20Rep
ort.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) ("Because of the intense interest in the way
the law will respond to emerging technology such as online auction sites, and
because this new venue so easily facilitates trademark infringement, the issue of
online auction site liability fosters much debate and speculation.").
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
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national standard will be created under the Lanham Act resolving
the current circuit split.
Recognizing the nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative
defense would clarify which party has the burden of proof under
the doctrine. In Tiffany II, eBay raised nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense, but because the circuit court refused to
recognize the doctrine, it is unclear who would have had the
burden of proof in the case.127 Furthermore, given the current
circuit split, practitioners have to meet different burdens depending
on which circuit hears their case. 128 If the case is heard under the
Ninth Circuit test, the defendant has the burden of proving there
was no "likelihood of confusion."1 29 But in the Third Circuit, the
plaintiff must prove there was a "likelihood of confusion" and then
the defendant must prove the elements of the test.13o
The jurisdictional divide on the issue of nominative fair use
also creates an efficiency problem from a practitioner's standpoint,
which is something that a national standard would mitigate.13 1 For
example, consider eBay and Tiffany, both of which are
international companies. Though this case was heard in New
York, eBay could have been sued in California and would have
had to meet a different burden of proof, even if the facts were
identical to this case.'32 As businesses are becoming more global
127 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 102-03.
128 Compare Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211,
221 22 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding the burden is on the defendant after the plaintiff
proves a "likelihood of confusion"), with New Kids on the Block v. News Am.
Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the burden is on the
plaintiff).
129 See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
"0 See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 221 (holding that the burden is on the
defendant after the plaintiff proves a "likelihood of confusion"). But qf New
Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff).
131 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 5-6 (2006), reprinted in 2006
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1093-94 (stating that one of the main reasons for the
revision of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was to resolve the current circuit
split and apply a national standard). The nominative fair use doctrine currently
exhibits a similar divide that led to the revision of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act.
132 See supra note 128.
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and the Internet is now reaching every part of the world, a uniform
standard for the nominative fair use doctrine is even more
important for these businesses.
Also, there is a need for more affirmative defenses in
trademark law.'33 Due to the fact that trademark law has expanded
to recognize many different causes of action, from comparative
advertising to trademark dilution to parody, some argue that the
law should also expand to recognize more affirmative defenses for
trademark law."4 This is particularly evident in Tiffany II, given
that the court is considering new causes of action in the online
marketplace.'35 If Congress fails to recognize more affirmative
defenses, consumers will be harmed because they will not be able
to use trademarks to fulfill their informational needs online.'36 For
example, eBay sellers will not be able to use the Tiffany trademark
to advertise Tiffany products online without the risk of liability
unless nominative fair use is recognized as an affirmative
defense."'
In addition, precedent supports adopting the nominative fair
use doctrine as an affirmative defense.13 ' The Third Circuit test
provides courts with a model and would be supported by the
proposed legislative amendments to the Lanham Act.13 9 The Third
133 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:11; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 99, 121
(2009).
134 See Dinwoodie, supra note 133, at 121-22. See generally Gerhardt, supra
note 4, at 430-31 (recognizing the expansion of trademark law and the trend of
harming consumer interests when using marks for informational purposes).
135 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (alleging direct trademark
infringement, contributory trademark infringement, false advertising, and
trademark dilution).
136 See id at 102-03 (discussing eBay's argument for the application of the
nominative fair use doctrine); Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 430-31 ("The harm is
especially apparent when trademark law is used to deny consumers the
opportunity to use trademarks to find information.").
137 See Tffany I, 600 F.3d at 102-03; Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 430-31.
138 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 122 23 (2004); see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc.,
425 F.3d 211, 221 22, 228 (3d Cir. 2005).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006) (applying nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense in trademark dilution claims).
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Circuit's approach is also supported by the Supreme Court
precedent of KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc.140 Though KP Permanent Make-Up is a case regarding the
classic fair use defense, the Supreme Court also placed the burden
of proof for the "likelihood of confusion" analysis on the plaintiff
before the classic fair use defense could be asserted.14' The
Lanham Act also recognizes "likelihood of confusion" as a
necessary component of trademark infringement, 4 2 and nominative
fair use is distinctly recognized as an affirmative defense in
§ 1125(c).'43
As a result of the Supreme Court decision and the Lanham Act,
the Third Circuit test requires the affirmative defense to be raised
only after the plaintiff proves the defendant's use created a
"likelihood of confusion."144 Even though Tiffany II did not
recognize nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, the
Second Circuit's analysis also included a comparable "likelihood
of confusion" analysis.'45
The Third Circuit model also aligns nominative fair use with
classic fair use, which is a logical extension of the doctrine because
the terms are often used interchangeably, though they have
different meanings.146 Both concepts involve descriptive uses of
marks and both involve an analysis of the extent to which the use
is likely to confuse users.14 Thus, statutorily, it would make sense
to treat these similar concepts similarly under the law.
140 543 U.S. 111, 122 23 (2004); accord Century 21, 425 F.3d at 221 22,
228.
141 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124.
142 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (2006).
143 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
144 See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 221-22, 228; see also id.; KP Permanent
Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124.
145 Tifany II, 600 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2010) ("We have recognized that a
defendant may lawfully use a plaintiffs trademark where doing so is necessary
to describe the plaintiffs product and does not imply a false affiliation or
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant.").
146 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 23:11.
147 Id
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Therefore, Tiffany II shows the need for the recognition of the
nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense in the
Lanham Act. This would create a national standard, making the
doctrine much easier for practitioners across the United States to
apply.148 Furthermore, this interpretation of the doctrine would
follow the precedent established by the Supreme Court in its
interpretation of the fair use doctrine and the statutory construction
of the Lanham Act.14 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Tiffany II shows the need for Congress to clarify the
nominative fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense so courts
will stop sidestepping the doctrine and practitioners can have a
national standard to follow. Given the current circuit split and the
various approaches to the doctrine, it is clear that there is a need
for legislative clarification. Opening the nominative fair use
defense to trademark infringement claims, other than just
trademark dilution claims, will protect users in the Internet age
from trademark infringement, especially in the online marketplace
context. Congress could resolve this problem by recognizing the
doctrine in § 1125(a), § 1114, and § 1115(b) of the Lanham Act.
Congress could also clarify nominative fair use as an affirmative
148 The present statutory confusion and circuit split present a significant
problem for practitioners. The primary question for practitioners is whether to
assert the doctrine in the first place, particularly in jurisdictions that have not
taken a position on the doctrine. In Tiffany II, for example, eBay decided to
assert the defense and the court applied a general definition of nominative fair
use, even though it did not formally apply the doctrine. See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d
at 103. Therefore, when in doubt, practitioners should assert the doctrine.
Practitioners should also encourage their clients to disclose anything that could
confuse a consumer via disclosure and implement a "notice-and-takedown"
procedure. In Tiffany II, eBay disclosed that many of the Tiffany products
disclosed on its Web site were fake and took extensive anti-counterfeit measures
including implementing a "notice-and-takedown" system. See id. Though not
all online companies will have the same resources as eBay, it will benefit them
to be "better safe than sorry" when it comes to taking part in policing for
counterfeit products and making adequate product disclosures.
149 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at
122-23.
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defense, like the Third Circuit, and align the doctrine with classic
fair use. Without these clarifications, however, companies like
Tiffany are left to wonder how to best protect their brands, and
practitioners continue to question how to best protect their global
clients in the online marketplace. Companies, practitioners, and
courts are likely to be confused until Congress takes action.
